Fordham Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 3

Article 7

2010

Adequacy of Current Succession Law in Light of the Constitution
and Policy Considerations
Benton Becker

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
79 Fordham L. Rev. 897 (2010).

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ADEQUACY OF CURRENT SUCCESSION LAW IN
LIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
Benton Becker*
I was pleased and honored to have the opportunity, in 1973, to represent
then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford at his confirmation hearings for the
Office of Vice President of the United States. Those were difficult and
trying times, as some of us in this room are old enough to remember. The
country was deeply split with respect to the Vietnam War, and there was
constant talk of the impeachment of the President, Richard M. Nixon. With
each day, a new revelation occurred that threw more coals on that fire to
impeach President Nixon. It was in that environment of divisiveness in this
country that Spiro T. Agnew, Nixon’s Vice President, on October 10, 1973,
resigned from office.1
His resignation was not, like John C. Calhoun’s as Vice President, a
voluntary one.2 Agnew’s resignation was virtually an agreed-upon
condition as a plea negotiation with respect to his entry of a nolo
contendere plea to bribery charges, negotiated by the Department of Justice.
Shortly thereafter, President Nixon nominated the House Minority
Leader, Gerald Ford, to his position. Then-Congressman Ford had been
under consideration by President Nixon in 1968 at the convention as a
running mate, but Nixon chose Agnew instead. In 1973, Gerald Ford was
the first person ever designated under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
serve in the Office of Vice President and to fill the vacancy that existed
there.
The Amendment was at that time, in 1973, about five years old. There
were no procedures. There were no standards. There were no rules. We
only knew what the Twenty-Fifth Amendment told us. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment told us that he had to be confirmed by a majority of the Senate,
and, for the very first time in American history, the first time in the
Constitution or in any statute, the House of Representatives got into the

* Counsel to Gerald R. Ford during the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Vice Presidential
Confirmation Hearings. This Article is adapted from Professor Becker’s remarks at the
Fordham University School of Law Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential
Succession System in the 21st Century, April 16-17, 2010.
1. James M. Naughton, Agnew Quits Vice Presidency and Admits Tax Evasion in ’67;
Nixon Consults on Successor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1.
2. Id. (reporting that in 1832, Vice President “John C. Calhoun stepped down after he
was chosen to fill a Senate seat from South Carolina”).
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confirmation act as well. Following the Senate confirmation, there had to
be a confirmation by the House.3
We did not know what committee we were going to appear before at the
Senate or the House. We did not know if the Senate was first or the House
was first. We did not know whether the votes were going to be taken on the
same day or were going to be done separately. Very little had been
implemented.
What we did know was that we had a Congressman who had served
eleven terms and had been in the House for twenty-three years. We knew
that, given the times and the tenor of the times in Washington at that point
and throughout the nation, the scope of the inquiry of Congressman Ford
would be far beyond the scope of the inquiry of any Cabinet member or
Article III judge’s confirmation procedure. It would be far, far more
detailed, because there were many people in Washington in September of
1973 who believed that this nominee was going to be President, one way or
another. Sooner or later, Richard Nixon was going to resign or be
impeached. And each day’s revelation seemed to support that premise.
Consequently, there was a very serious effort to undertake a
congressional background check of the man, Gerald Ford, who represented
the Fifth District of Michigan for twenty-three years. The congressional
background check included an immediate designation of seventy-two—
count them, seventy-two—FBI agents working full-time on the background
of this man.
Furthermore, every vote, every contribution, every matter that this man
had ever been involved with over that twenty-three year career in the House
became grist for the mill. The Bureau investigated all of these matters in
detail.
I was quickly informed, shortly after the nomination, that the Senate
rules, which would be followed by the House as well, provided that counsel
for Congressman Ford and Congressman Ford himself, would not have an
opportunity to read, inspect, challenge, or have any access whatsoever to
the FBI reports. Those reports, in their raw form, would be given to the
chairperson of the Senate committee and the House committee that were
undertaking the confirmation proceedings. Only the chair would get them,
not the members of the committee and not the nominee.
We were never given, although we asked for it in both bodies, a list of
witnesses that the committee might bring. We were able to get them
informally, through minority members of the committee in the Senate. For
example, Senator Bob Griffin of Michigan was extremely helpful to us in
helping us prepare for the confirmation proceedings before the Senate,
which were to occur first.
Let me say clearly that Gerald Ford was a Boy Scout all of his life. He
was a fine man, and there was really nothing there that could be injurious to
Gerald Ford. But I kept remembering back to a public statement that
Jimmy Hoffa once made when Bobby Kennedy had such a targeted
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.

2010]

REMARKS OF BENTON BECKER

899

investigation on everything that Jimmy Hoffa did. Hoffa implied that
nobody could withstand this kind of scrutiny.
I will tell you, Gerald Ford had ten times the scrutiny that Jimmy Hoffa
ever had by these committees.
The Senate undertook a complete audit of the last ten years of
Congressman Ford’s finances and undertook to question and explore his
background and his competency for the Office of Vice President in what I
considered to be a very professional way and a very thoughtful way and a
very courteous way—nothing more than I would have expected from the
United States Senate in 1973.
To the young people present, it may sound like I am talking about a
different planet or a different nation, when one looks at the partisanship that
exists in Washington today. That did not exist with the Ford confirmation
proceedings in the United States Senate.
There was a book on the bookstands at that time written by some lobbyist
named Robert Winter-Berger.4 The book, a very trashy book, made
references to members of Congress that Mr. Winter-Berger had allegedly
(or imaginatively) given money to over the years. The book was replete
with factual errors. Two of the members of Congress that Mr. WinterBerger claimed he gave money to had died two years before the alleged
payment. There was a reference to a date when Mr. Winter-Berger claimed
to have met with Congressman Ford in Congressman Ford’s Washington
office; however, to Mr. Winter-Berger’s embarrassment, Congressman Ford
was not in Washington on that date.5
We wanted to rid the issue of Winter-Berger at the Senate, before the
House undertook confirmation. The way we did that was, we asked for the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses that were brought by the Senate
committee. We were denied that. So we went back to our second source,
Bob Griffin. Senator Griffin from Michigan was very helpful. We
provided questions for Senator Griffin when Mr. Winter-Berger appeared.
Mr. Winter-Berger appeared before that Committee and testified for
probably two and a half or three hours. At the conclusion of the
Committee’s report, the committee transcribed Mr. Winter-Berger’s
testimony, and sent it to the Department of Justice with the
recommendation that the Department of Justice take a hard look at it and
consider whether or not perjury had been committed before the
Committee.6
We were satisfied that Mr. Winter-Berger’s testimony demonstrated that
he was devoid of credibility.

4. ROBERT N. WINTER-BERGER, THE GERALD FORD LETTERS (1974).
5. See generally id.
6. JAMES A. CANNON, TIME AND CHANCE: GERALD FORD’S APPOINTMENT WITH
HISTORY 242 (1994); J.Y. Smith & Lou Cannon, Gerald R. Ford, 93, Dies; Led in
Watergate’s Wake, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2006, at A1.
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Congressman Ford testified for approximately seven or eight hours
before the Committee.7
Prior to and during the Senate confirmation hearings, I became aware of
activity by the Executive Branch and the Nixon White House. White House
Chief of Staff Al Haig knew that FBI reports were not being given to the
nominee. He was aware that the rules that had been established by both
Houses provided that the FBI reports would not be given to the nominee nor
could the nominee view the contents of the reports directly or indirectly
through any backdoor. Yet that did not prevent General Haig, who was
Nixon’s Chief of Staff, from trying to surreptitiously deliver information to
Congressman Ford regarding what the FBI was doing, what they found, and
so forth. I discovered that surreptitious and self-serving effort by General
Haig and took immediate action. Approximately two weeks prior to Mr.
Ford’s appearance before the Senate Committee, I was present with him in
his congressional office preparing him for his Senate committee testimony.
Our work was interrupted by a secretary’s announcement that “General
Haig was on the phone for Congressman Ford.” Mr. Ford had listened to
General Haig, who commenced to relate the content of the FBI vice
presidential confirmation reports to the Congressman. With Congressman
Ford’s consent, I took the phone, interrupted the conversation, and as firmly
as I could, instructed General Haig to cease transmitting any such
information to Congressman Ford. I further informed the General that “we
would handle the confirmation, and we did not want or need White House
assistance.”
Let me give you an idea of the depth of the FBI inquiry into Mr. Ford’s
background. This was 1973. In the early 1940s, Gerald Ford played
football for the University of Michigan. He played sixty minutes. He was
the center and he was a linebacker. Against Ohio State, in his third year,
linebacker Gerald Ford was called for a penalty of unnecessary roughness
when tackling an Ohio State halfback.
Listen to this. More than thirty-three years later, in 1973, two FBI agents
found that halfback and asked him this question, “What unnecessary
roughness did linebacker Ford do?”
The halfback called the Congressman’s office and, quite highly amused,
told us of his silly encounter with the FBI. He thought it was amusing that
he would be interviewed by the FBI (incidentally, he volunteered that the
tackle was a “clean hit”). The FBI left no stone unturned, none at all.
The Senate committee, of course, voted favorably, the recommendation
to confirm.8 The Senate voted favorably. Within three days, we were
before a committee of the House of Representatives.9

7. See generally Marjorie Hunter, Ford Is Approved by Senate, 92–3; House Set To
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1973, at 1.
8. Id.
9. See Marjorie Hunter, Ford Sworn as Vice President After House Approves, 387–35,
He Vows Equal Justice for All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 1. See generally 119 CONG. REC.
39807–900 (1973); ANDREW DOWNER CRAIN, THE FORD PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY (2009).
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I never did find an adequate explanation for the House Committee
assignment, but I will simply tell you the bottom line. The bottom line,
despite numerous standing and special committees of the House to choose
from, Ford’s confirmation was assigned to the Judiciary Committee, which
was at that very time entertaining three impeachment resolutions against the
man who had nominated Ford for Vice President. It was a far more hostile
audience than the Senate committee. Of course, it was a larger Committee
in terms of the number of members. Consequently, the number of
questioning minutes Committee members were afforded was shorter than
that of the Senate committee.10
But at times it seemed that the House committee was not a committee of
the Federal Legislature, but it more closely resembled a political convention
of ambitious politicians. Members were making speeches about Richard
Nixon and adding to their end of their speech, “Now, if you were President,
would you do that, Congressman Ford?” or “What do you think about
that?” and trying to get Congressman Ford to speak about Nixon and to
stoke the fires of divisiveness. Several of the Committee members were not
seeking factual and truthful information about the Congressman and/or his
nomination.11 I do not include all of the Committee members, but many of
them appeared to me as such.
For example, Congressman John Conyers, who is now, as we speak
today, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was a member of
that committee in 1973. As the committee questioning went around the
room—“you’re next,” “you’re next,” “you’re next”—each time it got
around to Congressman Conyers, he made the same remarks and comments.
He said, in essence, “I can’t ask any questions of you, Congressman,
because I was denied the FBI reports.” Only the Chairman has the FBI
reports, and the Chairman will not share them with the other members.12
Congressman Ford advised that he was in the same predicament, i.e.
without FBI reports, and simply offered to answer any questions Committee
members may have.
Conversely, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, from New York, took
exactly the opposite tack, saying in essence, “I’m only given X number of
minutes. I don’t have time for you to answer all of my questions, so let me
just tell you what my questions are.” Thereupon she read a number of
questions not seeking, because of time restrictions, any answers.13 We
would always ask the Congresswoman for her questions and submit written
answers within days. Just questions, questions, questions, and no answers.
Many of the questions implied serious deficiencies with respect to the

10.
11.
12.
13.

See generally 119 CONG. REC. at 39807–900.
See generally id.
See generally id. at 39825–34.
See id. at 39809–12.
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character, dignity, and qualifications of Congressman Ford.14 Nonetheless,
I believe, we conducted ourselves as gentlemen.
There was a member from California named Jerome Waldie, who was
blatantly running for the Democratic Party nomination for Governor of
California. He saw the Ford confirmation procedures by the House
Committee as an opportunity to gain some notoriety and ink in California.
His questions directed at Mr. Ford were calculated to enhance his candidacy
with, in my opinion, little interest in exploring the candidate’s
qualifications. Congressman’s Waldie’s Committee behavior, I remember
telling Mr. Ford, demonstrated the wisdom of our Founding Fathers who
wrote the Constitution, and specifically excluded the House of
Representatives from any confirmation consideration. Many of Waldie’s
questions pertained to Mr. Ford’s recommendation to the Judiciary
Committee that it explore Justice William O. Douglas’s receipt of
compensation for service on boards of directors while he was a member of
the Supreme Court.15
My goodness gracious, you would think that Congressman Ford had
asked for the moon or was accusing someone or even trying to impeach
someone. Never was that his intent. His intent was merely to investigate
compensation received by Justice Douglas and Article III judges. Wrongly,
Mr. Waldie’s questions on this subject inferred a sinister motive by
Congressman Ford.
The Judiciary Committee, after going through many, many sessions,
concluded its work with a favorable majority vote. The full House voted
overwhelmingly in favor of confirmation.16
On December 6, 1973, Congressman Ford was sworn in as the Vice
President of the United States, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.17
Let me add a word or two, because the story does not end there. These
were harsh times for our nation and our Constitution. In December 1973,
when Gerald Ford became the Vice President of the United States, the
media focus was on Watergate, Richard Nixon, the people in the Nixon
White House, the Special Prosecutor indictments, the White House tape
revelations, and the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry,
resulting in even greater divisiveness in the nation. It was a very, very
heated time. It is in that environment, on December 6, 1973, that Gerald
Ford became the Vice President.
There were people in high positions in the Nixon White House who
honestly believed, and carried out their beliefs with their behavior, that Vice
President Gerald Ford was nothing more than another middle-level
executive branch officer, who could be told what to do. And punished
14. See generally id. at 39807–900. See also Gerald R. Ford Biography, GERALD R.
FORD PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/grf/fordbiop.asp (last
updated Feb. 5, 2008).
15. See generally 39820–21.
16. See Marjorie Hunter, Ford Sworn as Vice President After House Approves, 387–35;
He Vows Equal Justice for All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 1.
17. See id.
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severely for failure to behave as told. As a consequence, key members of
the Nixon White House undertook to take advantage of Vice President
Ford’s good nature and of his general disposition, practiced throughout his
political life, to be a good team player. These individuals took advantage of
the Vice President’s characteristics, by among other ways, scheduling him
for speeches around the nation without his prior approval. They would send
him memos that read, “You have been scheduled to speak in Kansas on
such-and-such a day and in Alabama on another such day, before such-andsuch group. The White House staff will write your speech.”
The Vice President’s office was located in the Executive Office Building,
next door to the White House. The Washington political culture at that time
held that the closer your office was to the office of the President, the greater
your influence. Conversely, the farther away your office was to the office
of the President, the less your influence. Vice President Ford visited the
Nixon White House by invitation, not by vocation.
Those speeches that were prepared by the White House staff never
arrived early. Most often they never arrived before the Vice President
boarded the Air Force II to go to the speech location. Sometimes the
speech draft did not arrive even after the Vice President landed. On a few
occasions, the Vice President was already seated at the event head table
when he was handed, for the first time, a draft of the speech he was
scheduled to make.
I can only tell you that many of the Nixon White House staff prepared
speeches for the Vice President that were Agnew-like, blind defenses of
Nixon and the Nixon White House.
But Gerald Ford was, for the first two to three months, unwilling to
confront that issue. His team-player nature continued to control.
I had a session with him sometime in early March or early April of 1974.
Very clearly, I let him know that he held the only position in the White
House that Richard Nixon could not fire. Of course, he knew that, but he
had not fully realized that he had been cast in an Agnew role, blindly
defending the President.
Furthermore, as it became clear—more and more daily—Richard Nixon
was either going to resign or be impeached. That truism forced the
recognition that, “Someday you are going to be President. You are not
going to be President of Richard Nixon’s constituency. You are going to be
President of the United States, and the people in the United States have to
accept you as their President, not Richard Nixon’s replacement. Your
honesty and your candor have to be brought forth to the people. That will
not happen if you allow the Nixon White House to manipulate you with
these speeches.”
In true Gerald Ford fashion, he immediately understood, he was
sympathetic to it, and he went beyond what I recommended.
I
recommended no more speeches by the White House staff. Further, the
Vice President would not commit in advance unless his office wrote the
speech.
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But beyond that, in the month of May of 1974, Gerald Ford attended a
Cabinet meeting. This coincided, as I recollect, with the revelation of the
smoking-gun White House tape of March of 1972.18
Vice President Ford attended a Cabinet meeting and, at the Cabinet
meeting, requested and received permission to make an off-the-agenda
remark and announced to President Nixon—in the presence of the
Cabinet—that he could no longer and would no longer publicly support this
administration or this President in its public comments regarding the
Watergate matter.
This was an act of great courage and guts. I always thought that the Vice
President’s statement, among other acts that he did, including the pardon of
Richard Nixon, represented great demonstration of political courage on his
part. In his retirement, we spoke frequently and visited frequently. He was
most proud of so many of the offices and awards that he had received over
the years. But the one that pleased him the most was the award that Senator
Ted Kennedy and Caroline Kennedy presented to him: the Kennedy Family
Profiles in Courage Award.19 This award represented the political courage
demonstrated by President Ford during his Presidency. Although the award
was specifically focused on President Ford’s pardon grant to Richard
Nixon, I always believed that President Ford’s Cabinet announcement of no
longer defending the Nixon White House was equally politically
courageous.
In response to the question of whether there is a conflict of interest with
legislative succession, let me respond briefly to that and tell you that when
Congressman Ford was being confirmed, the Speaker of the House, Carl
Albert, was second in line, from the moment of Agnew’s resignation, and
would remain the second in line until such time as someone occupied the
Vice Presidency and President Ford was confirmed.
We were concerned initially about the possibility of some future
Speaker—not necessarily Carl Albert, but any Speaker—who might want to
become President and might see an opportunity to advance his or her
position to the White House by simply delaying and delaying and
frustrating, and possibly even denying confirmation to a vice presidential
designee or Vice President nominee. It was a serious concern. If you had,
theoretically, a Newt Gingrich who wanted to be President, who
theoretically had the authority and the power to withhold confirmation out
of the House, withhold the Committee hearings, control the vote on the
floor in such a way as to stretch out and lengthen that process until maybe
18. For information on the White House tapes, see White House Tapes, NIXON
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://nixon.archives.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/
index.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2010).
19. Jeff Jacoby, Commentary: Ford’s Act of Clemency – Americas – International
Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/
world/americas/27iht-web.1227ford.globe.4027875.html; News Release, Special One Hour
Documentary “Profiles in Courage: A Kennedy Legacy” To Be Broadcast Nationally on
August 26, on NBC Stations, JOHN. F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Aug. 17,
2006), http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK+Library+and+Museum/News+and+Press/Profiles+in+
Courage+A+Kennedy+Legacy+to+Air+on+NBC+Stations.htm.
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the President is impeached or resigned—you might have such an ambitious
person sometime in the future.
Let me make it very clear that that was not the case in 1974. The case in
1974 was that Carl Albert was very anxious to move down the succession
ladder from number two to number three. He was very cooperative at every
step of the way in moving the nomination forward. But we had an initial
concern on that score.
In 1974, when President Ford was confirmed, Washington and the
Congress were different from today. Who among us today, in 2010, does
not recognize the partisanship and the divisive nature of the Congress of the
United States has changed considerably in that forty or fifty-year period?
Without reflecting on the present Speaker, it would seem to me a far greater
likelihood for pure partisanship controlling an unfavorable and unfair result
by delaying the nomination. In the present atmosphere there exists in
Washington partisanship that did not exist in 1974 with President Ford.

